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INEQUALITY IN MARITAL LIABILITIES:
THE NEED FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
WHEN MODIFYING THE NECESSARIES
DOCTRINE

Under the common law doctrine of necessaries, if a husband neglects
to furnish necessaries 1 to his wife, she may purchase them herself on
his credit. 2 This doctrine was once widely accepted 3 as necessary to
I. Although the common law originally narrowly defined necessaries to mean only such basic
items as food, drink, clothing, and shelter, this definition has been expanded to include all things
necessary and suitable, given the spouses' status and condition in life. See, e.g., Anderson v.
W.T. Grant Co., 45 Ala. App. 105, 226 So. 2d 166 (1969); Chipp v. Murray, 191 Kan. 73,
379 P.2d 297 (1963); Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961); see also 2 R. LEE,
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW§ 132 (3d ed. 1963) (factors to be considered in each case include:
the status, earning capacity and wealth of the husband; the customs and fashions of the time;
and the general standard of living). For examples of what have been held to be necessaries other
than the basic items of food, drink, clothing, and shelter, see McCormick v. Sexton, 239 Ark.
29, 386 S.W.2d 930 (1965) (funeral expenses); Fenters v. Fenters, 238 Ga. 131, 231 S.E.2d 741
(1977) (legal expenses incurred in divorce proceeding); Rubin v. Rubin, 233 Md. 118, 195 A.td
696 (1963) (fees wife paid to private detective hired to obtain evidence to use against her husband
in divorce case); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N.E. 350 (1922) (furniture
and other household goods); Bowes v. Bowes, 43 N.C. App. 586,259 S.E.2d 389 (1979) (medical
expenses); State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d 533, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977) (legal expenses incurred to
defend against a criminal charge that could result in incarceration). But see .Chipp v. Murray,
191 Kan. 73, 379 P.2d 297 (1963) (fees wife paid to detective hired to discover evidence against
her husband on which to base a separation action are not necessaries); Johnson & Maxwell,
Ltd. v. Lind, 288 N.W.2d 763 (N.D. 1980) (legal costs incurred during divorce are not necessaries).
2. See Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955); Sillery v. Fagan, 120 N.J. Super.
416, 294 A.2d 624 (1972); New York Tel. Co. v. Teichner, 69 Misc. 2d 135, 329 N.Y.S.2d 689
(Dist. Ct. 1972); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 246 Pa. Super. 455, 371 A.2d 925 (1977); H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.3 (1968).
3. See, e.g., A. & W. Hughes v. Chadwick, 6 Ala. 651 (1844); Schlothan v. Schlothan, 5
Alaska 162 (1914); Beverly v. Nance, 145 Ark. 589, 224 S.W. 956 (1920); Davis v. Fyfe, 107
Cal. App. 281, 290 P. 468 (1930); Stokes v. Dollard, 94 Colo. 206, 29 P.2d 706 (1934); Cohn
v. Snyder, 102 Conn. 703, 130 A. 100 (1925); Parkinson v. Hammond, 35 Del. 145, 159 A.
846 (1932); Phillips v. Sanchez, 35 Fla. 187, 17 So. 363 (1895); Morrison v. Evans, 31 Ga. App.
256, 120 S.E. 430 (1923); Ing v. Chung, 34 Hawaii 709 (1938); Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho
645, 92 P. 842 (1907); Abrams v. Traster, 244 Ill. App. 533 (1927); Litson v. Brown, 26 Ind.
489 (1866); Descelles v. Kadmus, 8 Iowa 51 (1859); Frisby v. Hladky, 139 Kan. 517, 31 P.2d
1001 (1934); Billing v. Pilcher & Hauser, 46 Ky. 458 (1847); Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315,
115 So. 575 (1928); Furlong v. Hysom, 35 Me. 332 (1853); Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24,
59 A. 139 (1904); Shaw v. Thompson, 33 Mass. 198 (1834); Annis v. Manthey, 234 Mich. 347,
208 N.W. 453 (1926); Carr v. Anderson, 154 Minn. 162, 191 N.W. 407 (1923); Galtney v. Wood,
149 Miss. 56, 115 So. 117 (1928); County of Audrain v. Muir, 297 Mo. 499, 249 S.W. 383
(1923); McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 284 P. 532 (1930); Acton·v. Schoenauer, 121 Neb.
62, 236 N.W. 140 (1931); Jewell v. Jewell, 53 Nev. 97, 292 P. 616 (1930); Ott v. Hentall, 70
N.H. 231, 47 A. 80 (1899); Asche v. Wakely, 112 N.J. Eq. 60, 163 A. 278 (1932); Chevallier
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protect dependent wives and is based on the husband's general duty
to support his wife and family. 4 Recent economic and _legal
developments, however, have required a reconsideration of the
necessaries doctrine; the increasing independence of women and the
Supreme Court's insistence that men and women be treated equally5
have led many courts and legislatures to modify this doctrine. 6 Most
of the modifications implemented are gender neutral and comply with
the Supreme Court's decisions on gender discrimination. 7 One modification, however, continues to treat husbands and wives unequally by
holding the husband primarily liable and the wife secondarily liable
for all debts incurred by the couple for necessaries. 8 Despite the obv. Connors, 33 N.M. 93, 262 P. 173 (1927); Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135
(1903); Bowen v.· Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915); Badger v. Orr, I Ohio App.
293 (1913); Schiefer v. Wilson, 171 Okla. 119, 42 P.2d 263 (1935); Taylor v. Taylor, 54 Or.
560, 103 P. 524 (1909); Moore v. Copley, 165 Pa. 294, 30 A. 829 (1895); Marshall v. Perkins,
20 R.I. 34, 37 A. 301 (1897); Scates v. Canvas Decoy Co., 5 Tenn. App. 695 (1927); Crosby
v. A. Harris & Co., 234 S.W. 127 (fex. Civ. App. 1921); Joseph Frost & Co. v. Willis, 13
Vt. 202 (1841); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921); Hinton Dep't Co. v.
Lilly, 105 W. Va. 126, 141 S.E. 629 (1928); Lichtenberger v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 197 Wis.
336, 222 N.W. 218 (1928). The majority of these cases are no longer followed, having been
either expressly or implicitly overruled by statute or case law. For those states that still adhere
to the common law doctrine, see infra note 17.
4. The common law doctrine provided a means of enforcing the husband's support obligation. See generally H. Cl.ARK, supra note 2, § 6.1 (1968). This obligation arose out of the marital
relationship, see, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 27 Ill. App. 2d 24, 169 N.E.2d 172 (1960); Gorco
Constr. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 479 n.7, 99 N.W.2d 69, 73 n.7 (1959), and was based on the
view that performance of the wife's marital duties was consideration for the obligation, see,
e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940); In re Sonnicksen's Estate, 23
Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643 (1937).
The common law did not, however, impose a duty of support on the wife. As a result, she
could not be held liable for necessaries furnished to her family. See, e.g., Mergenthaler v. Mergenthaler, 69 Cal. App. 2d 525, 160 P .2d 121 (1945); Parkinson v. Hammond, 35 Del. 145, 159
A. 846 (1932); Truax v. Ellett, 234 Iowa 1217, 15 N.W.2d 361 (1944).
5. Historically the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the legislature's decision
to adopt a gender-based classification. In recent years, however, the Court has begun to scrutinize
closely such classifications to determine their constitutionality under the equal protection clause.
See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text; see also Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal - The
Supreme Court and Gender Classification Cases: 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1981); The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. I, 177-88 (1977). The Court's demand for equal
treatment applies even where the laws are designed to benefit women if, by according differential
treatment to women, the law is reinforcing traditional stereotypes that tend to place women in
a subordinate position. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-24 to -26 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357, 1359
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the support obligation of the wife is coequal with that
of the husband); Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, __ Ind.App. __, 430 N.E.2d 412, 416 (1982)
(holding the wife primarily liable for her own expenses); Condore v. Prince George's County,
Md., 289 Md. 516, 530-32, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018 (1981) (holding the common law doctrine of
necessaries invalid after passage of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment).
7. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 258, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976); Klump v. Klump,
96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273 (1954); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314
N.W.2d 326 (1982).
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vious inequality of this "primary/secondary" modification, no court
has struck it down. 9
This Note contends that the "primary/secondary" modification is
unconstitutional 10 because it ignores the husband's equal protection
rights while unlawfully stigmatizing women as dependent. Part I
discusses how the growing independence of women has led courts to
modify the common law doctrine. Part II develops the test that the
Supreme Court would apply in judging the constitutionality of any
modification of the doctrine. Part III applies this test to the
"primary/secondary" modification and concludes that the modification
is unconstitutional and, therefore, not a legitimate reformation of the
common law necessaries doctrine.

I.

THE CoNDmONS DEMANDING REFORM OF THE COMMON
LAW RULE AND THE :RESULTING MODIFICATIONS

Implicit in the common law doctrine is the assumption that the wife
depended upon her husband to provide for her financial needs. This
dependency was unavoidable due to the legal and economic disabilities
imposed on wives by the common law. Typically, at common law the
husband acquired rights to all of his wife's property immediately upon
marriage. 11 Consequently, the wife was entirely without personal assets
9. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 10S Wis. 2d S06, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982). Although
it appears that only the Wisconsin courts have acknowledged the constitutional problem, it unquestionably exists because "statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females
are 'subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.'" Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 7S (1971)). Furthermore, although Craig and
Reed involved statutory classifications, the required scrutiny applies"equally to judicial action.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
10. This Note does not specifically address the constitutionality of the common law doctrine.
Nevertheless, the arguments regarding the constitutionality of the modification also can be applied to the common law doctrine. Indeed, at least five states have rejected the common law
doctpne as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. See Condore v. Prince George's
County, Md., 289 Md. S16, S30, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018 (1981); Jersey Shore Medical CenterFitkin Hosp. _v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 147-48, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980); Kilbourne
v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983); Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., __
Va. _
303 S.E.2d 90S (1983). Similarly, the Georgia legislature repealed Georgia's codified
necessaries doctrine, GA. CooE ANN.§ S3-S10 (1974), in order to "comply with those standards
of equal protection under the law announced in •.. Orr v. Orr[, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)).'' Act
of April 4, 1979, 1979 Ga. Laws 466, 469.
·
11. H. CLARK, supra note 2, § 7.1. Although the passage of the Married Woman's Property
Acts removed many of the common law disabilities by allowing married women to have their
own separate estates, bring suits, and enter contracts, id. § 7.2, as a practical matter, some
dependency remained, see Amsler, The New Ma"ied Woman's Statutes: Meaning and Effect,
15 BAYLOR L. ~ - 14S, 149-S3 (1963) (under Texas law, although a wife may unilaterally sell
her separate property and contract for goods in her own name, the purchaser or creditor may
continue to require her husband's joinder); Comment, Marital Property: A New Look at Old
Inequalities, 39 ALB. L. REv. 52, S4-S6, 61-62, 70-73 (1974) (as a practical matter, most wives
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and unable even to provide the consideration necessary to enter
contracts. 12
'J'.oday, however, many wives are not dependent upon their husbands 13
and courts can no longer presume a need to provide them with financial protection. Not only do a significant number of married women
work outside the home 14 and contribute jointly with their husbands
to the family resources, 15 in some marriages the wife is the sole
provider. 16 This change in marital roles, along with the growing
awareness that the law requires equal treatment of men and women,
has led most courts and legislatures to view the common law necessaries
doctrine as an anachronism demanding reform. 11
are in no better position as a result of the Property Acts than they were under the common
law). Moreover, the passage of the Acts typically did not relieve the husband of his duty of
support. See, e.g., In re Tunison's Estate, 75 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1948); Loveman, Joseph
& Loeb, Inc. v. Rogers, 39 Ala. App. 162, 96 So. 2d 691 (1957); Stein v. Woodward & Lothrop,
77 A.2d 564 (D.C. 1950). Rather, liability continued to be imposed on the husband for all goods
purchased by the wife unless she evidenced a clear intention to bind her separate estate. See,
e.g., Herring v. Holden, 88 Ga. App. 212, 76 S.E.2d 515 (1953); New York Tel. Co. v. Teichner,
69 Misc. 2d 135, 329 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Dist. Ct. 1972).
12. See H. Cl.ARK, supra note 2, § 7.1.
13. In March 1981, both husband and wife worked in 520/o of all married-couple families.
See Hayghe, Marital and family patterns of workers: an update, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1982,
at 53, 55 table 4; see also Kamerman, Child care and family benefits: policies of six industrialized countries, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Nov. 1980, at 23. ("Our country's most prevalent family
type is now the two-parent, two-wage-earner family."). The increasing number of working wives
is likely to continue. It has been projected that two-thirds of the labor force growth between
1980-1995 will be generated by women. See Fullerton, The 1995 labor force: a first look, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Dec. 1980, at 11.
14. Fifty-one percent of all married women with husbands present were part of the labor
force in March 1981. See Hayghe, supra note 13, at 54 table I.
15. In 1978, the average amount of the family income attributed to the wife's earnings was
260/o. See Johnson, Marital and family characteristics of the labor force, March 1979, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Apr. 1980, at 48.
16. In 1981, the wife was the only wage earner in almost three and one-half percent of marriedcouple families. See Hayghe, supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137,
147-49, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980) ("The common law rule imposing liability on husbands,
but not wives, is an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary society. . . . The common
law must adapt to the progress ·of women in achieving economic equality and to the mutual
sharing of all obligations by husbands and wives."); see also Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc.
v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj,
__ Ind. App. __, 430 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1982); Condore v. Prince George's County, Md.,
289 Md. 516, 530-32, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018-19 (1981).
A few states continue to explicitly follow the common law doctrine. See, e.g., Automobile
Club Ins. Co. v. Lainhart, 609 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (relying on the statutory codification
of the common law embodied in KY. REv. STAT. § 404.040 (1972)); In re Dupont, 19 Bankr.
605_(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Bowes v. Bowes, 43 N.C. App. 586,259 S.E.2d 389 (1979). Some states
have not addressed the issue recently, but appear to adhere to the common Jaw. See, e.g., Green
v. First Nat'! Bank, 49 Ala. App. 426, 272 So. 2d 895 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 290 Ala.
14, 272 So. 2d 901 (1972); Parkinson v. Hammond, 35 Del. 145, 159 A. 846 (1932) (cited with
apparent approval in Hyland v. Southwell, 320 A.2d 767 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974)); Banker v.
Dodge, 126 Vt. 534, 237 A.2d 121 (1967). In still other states it appears that the common law
rule, while not explicitly overruled, may no longer be followed given the courts' treatment of
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Four basic modifications of this doctrine have resulted. 18 The most
common modification holds ~oth spouses jointly and severally liable
for all necessary expenses. This modification has generally been imposed by statute and appears primarily in states that have adopted an
Equal Rights Amendment. 19 At the other extreme, Maryland courts
hold neither spouse liable for necessaries furnished to the other in the
absence of an express or implied contract. 20 A third modification holds
each spouse primarily liable for the debts he or she incurs for necessaries
and holds the other spouse secondarily liable. 21 These modifications
are, on their face, gender neutral, 22 and no question arises as to their
constitutionality in this regard under the equal protection clause. 23
The fourth modification provides that a husband is always primarily liable and a wife always secondarily liable for all debts incurred

analogous situations. Compare Trotter v. Minnis, 199 Ark. 924, 136 S.W.2d 463 (1940) and
Brown v. Durepo, 121 Me. 226, 116 A. 451 (1922) (both recognizing the common law rule)
with Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983) (awarding of attorney's fees
in divorce proceeding is discretionary with the court and dependent upon financial abilities of
the parties) and Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978) (alimony statute allowing for support
of wives only is an unconstitutional denial of men's equal protection rights).
18. There are a few minor exceptions to these basic patterns. The principle variation is found
in some community property states where necessaries are considered to be debts of the marital
community and are first satisfied with community property. In the absence of sufficient community property, however, one of the four modifications will be applied. See A.Riz. REv. ST~TANN. § 25-215 (1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.090 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-11 (1978).
Another variation is found in Massachusetts, where the wife is liable for necessaries up to the
amount of $JOO but only if she has property worth at least $2000. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
209, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1981). If the wife does not own $2000 of property, the common law
will be applied.
19. These statutes have generally been of two types: Family Expense Acts held to include
necessaries, see CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 14-6-110 (1973) (ERA); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 1015 (1979)
(ERA); IowA CODE ANN.§ 597.14 (West 1981) (no ERA); WASH. REv. CODE§ 26-16-205 (1981)
(ERA), and statutes which were enacted to deal specifically with the question of necessaries,
see HAWAII REY. STAT.§ 573-7 (Supp. 1982) (ERA); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 40-2-102 (1981) (ERA).
In addition, Mississippi has adopted this modification judicially. See Cooke v. Adams, 183 So.
2d 925 (Miss. 1966) (no ERA).
20. See Condore v. Prince George's County, Md., 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
21. See Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, __ Ind.App._, 430 N.E.2d 412 (1982); Busch v.
Busch Constr., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate
of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980); see also Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v.
McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a legislatively mandated
gender-neutral duty of support requires that both spouses be responsible for the other's necessaries
but expressly leaving open the question of whether the spouse not incurring the debt is liable
only if the spouse incurring the debt is unable to pay).
22. In other words, these classifications do not provide for different treatment of males and
females on the basis of their gender.
23. This does not preclude the possibility that these modifications may violate the equal protection clause because of some discriminatory effect unrelated to gender. Without actual gender
discrimination, however, these modifications would be scrutinized under the more lenient rational basis test, thereby virtually guaranteeing their constitutionality under the equal protection
clause. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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by either spouse for necessaries. 24 This modification differs from the
others because it continues the common law practice of imposing an
unequal share of financial responsibility upon the husband. Consequently, this modification fails to promote the equal treatment of men
and women demanded by modern social and legal conditions.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF
GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS

Traditionally, the Supreme Court applied a rational basis test 25 to
determine the constitutionality of any law26 providing for different treatment of men and women. Under this test, which continues to be used
in cases of economic and social welfare legislation, the Court upholds
all laws reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. 21 Because
broad deference is usually given to the legislative determination of
whether a law is reasonably related to a government purpose, most
laws challenged under this test are upheld. 28
Early application of this test to laws basing treatment on gender was
in accord with prevailing legal and social views of women. 29 By nature,
24. At least six states have adopted this view either by statute or judicial decree: Page v.
Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 2S8, 36S A.2d 1118 (1976) (interpreting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-37
(1981)); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 42-201 (1978}; Klump v. Klump, 96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273
(19S4} (interpreting Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Baldwin 1982}}; OKLA. STAT. tit. 32, §
3 (1981}; W. VA. CODE § 48-3-22 (1980}; Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d S06, 314
N.W.2d 326 (1982).
2S. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 16-24, at 1060 (until the 1970's, gender classifications were
upheld whenever they were reasonably related to a governmental purpose}.
26. Whether the claim is brought against a state or federal law is insignificant. Although
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only to states, the Supreme
Court has held that there is an implicit federal equal protection component in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (19S4}. Moreover, the
equal protection analysis under either amendment is identical. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 93 (1976} (per curiam); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 518 (1978} [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
27. See L. TRIBE, supra note S, §§ 16-2 to -5.
28. This test assumes the validity of the legislature's judgment in creating the classification.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 42S-26 (1960). The Court grants this deference because
judges have no greater capability than legislators to assess the reasonableness of social and economic
legislation. NOWAK, supra note 26, at S24. In exercising this deference, the Court may even
consider possible legislative purposes other than those articulated. See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1960). But see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, ZT0 (1973) (the Court's
only inquiry is whether the "challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated
state purpose"}. Consequently the Court will uphold a classification if there is any conceivable
set of facts supporting it. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 426; Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Because of this deference, the rational basis test
has been described as requiring "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther,

The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
29. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 16-24.
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women were considered too delicate for many occupations in civil life.
In addition, most. members of society felt that a woman,s obligation
was to the home and family. 30 To-fulfill this obligation, many lawmakers
believed that women needed special legal protections. 31 Application of
the rational basis test allowed legislatures to pass such protections freely 32
and reflected the general societal consensus that they were appropriate.
During the-1970,s, however, the Court began to recognize that the
changing role of women demanded application of a more stringent test. 33
Socially, women were gaining an equal footing with men, and laws
discriminating against them or stereotyping them as domestic were· no
longer considered appropriate. 34 Yet because gender-based discrimination had strong roots in social conventions and lacked the invidiousness
of other forms of discrimination, such as racial discrimination, 35 the
Court was reluctant to overturn these laws under the same strict
scrutiny36 analysis used in these other cases. Rather, the Court sought
30. Id.; see also Bradwell v. State:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . • . The paramount destiny and·
mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator.
83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
31. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish:
[A] woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her
at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence .•. [H]er physical well-being becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of
the race •••. Hence she [is] properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed
for her protection may be sustained even when like legislation is not necessary for men
and could not be sustained.
300 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1937) (citation omitted).
Even as late as the 1960's, the Court held that a woman's central role in raising a family
permitted discriminatory legislation encouraging women to remain in the home. See, e.g., Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (upholding a state law excluding women from jury service
absent an indication that they desired to serve).
32. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (allowing jury selection that automatically
excluded women absent an indication from them that they wanted to serve); Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute forbidding any female from working as a bartender unless
she were the wife or daughter of a male owner of the establishment); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (allowing establishment of minimum wages for women but not for
men); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitation on number of hours women
were allowed to work); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that women were not
guaranteed the right to vote by the fourteenth amendment) .
. 33. See Loewy, supra note 5, at 87-95.
34. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ("No longer is the female destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and
the world of ideas.").
35. "Traditionally, [gender-based] discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' ... firmly rooted in our national consciousness .•.." Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion). Such "romantic paternalism," while injurious, lacks
the overt hostility commonly characteristic of other forms of discrimination.
36. The strict scrutiny test is applied in cases involving fundamental rights or a suspect class.
Under this test, discriminatory legislation will be struck down "unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969)
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to develop a middle-tier test commensurate with the unique aspects
of gender discrimination. 37
The Supreme Court initially developed this middle-tier analysis in
Reed v. Reed. 38 There, the Court held that to withstand scrutiny, a
gender-based classification must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 39 Although the Court did not
expressly state that it was applying a new standard,40 both the language
and outcome41 of this opinion clearly indicated that the Court was
developing a new test. ·
This new test was not fully refined or officially recognized until the
Supreme Court decided Craig v. Boren 42 in 1976. Applying what has
become known as the ''middle-tier'' approach, the Court in Craig held
that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. " 43 This test demands
(emphasis in original), and is the least drastic means of achieving that objective, San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973). For a thorough treatment of the strict
scrutiny test, see L. TRIBE, supra note 5, §§ 16-6 to -18.
37. With only a temporary detour, see infra, the evolvement toward a level of scrutiny
somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny has been constant. See infra notes 38-43
and accompanying text. The single exception was a brief flirtation with the strict scrutiny test
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). In that case, a plurality
of the Court found classifications based on gender to be inherently suspect and applied the strict
scrutiny test to invalidate a statute presuming that wives of male members of the uniformed
services were dependent but requiring husbands of female members to prove their dependence.
38. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
39. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
40. The Court actually purported to apply the rational basis test, holding that the classification had to bear "a rational relationship to a state objective." 404 U.S. at 76.
41. Professor Gunther suggests that had the rational basis test been used, the classification
would have been upheld. The Court recogni2ed the legitimacy of the state's objective to reduce
administrative disputes in appointing estate administrators, and since "clear priority classifications" were relevant to this objective, the classification should have been upheld. By striking
down the classification, the Court demonstrated a "special sensitivity to sex as ·a classifying factor." Gunther, supra note 28, at 34.
42. 429 U.S. 190, 210 & n. • (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 197. The Court explicitly stated that Reed and subsequent cases required the application of this test. Not all of the justices agreed, however. See id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's conclusion that a law which treats males less favorably than females
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives' apparently comes out of thin air.").
Since Craig, the Court has consistently applied this test. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3339 (1982); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)
(plurality opinion); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1979); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (per curiam); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11
(1977) (plurality opinion); see also Rotsker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70-72 (1981) (recognizing
the test in Craig, but giving extraordinary deference to Congress's determination of the best
alternative because of the military context).
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more than the rational basis test in two respects. First, the law must
relate to an important government purpose; a higher standard than
the legitimate purpose required by the rational basis test. Second, the
test requires that the law have a substantial rather than merely reasonable
relation to this objective.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE MIDDLE-TIER TEST
TO THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY MODIECATION OF
THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES

A. Important State Objective
The first step in applying the middle-tier approach is determining
whether the law examined serves an important state objective. 44
Historically, the purpose of the doctrine of necessaries bas been to
provide for needy wives by allowing them to obtain necessary goods
and services where they are personally unable to pay for them. 45 This
purpose has survived in the primary/secondary modification of the doctrine which continues to protect wives by holding them only secondarily liable for necessaries they purchase. Because the Supreme 9ourt
has determined that providing support for needy spouses is an important governmental objective, 46 the primary/secondary test survives the
44. In determining the purpose of legislation scrutinized under this test, the Court need not
accept legislative assertions of purpose at face value when an examination of the legislative scheme
and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose was not the goal of the legislation. See
Weinburger v. \Viesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1974); Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
448-49 (1972).
45. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105
Wis. 2d 506, 510-11, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (1982) ("The heart of the common law rule is
a concern for the support and the sustenance of the family and the individual members thereof•
. . . The necessaries rule encourages the extension of credit to those who in an individual capacity
may not have the ability to make these basic purchases."). Another possible, though unarticulated,
purpose is the protection of creditors. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the necessaries
doctrine in achieveing either of these objectives, see Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries,
82 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1984).
46. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 280 (1979). The Court has never explained exactly why support of needy spouses is an important governmental objective. One possibility is that the Court is concerned about the sanctity
of marriage and the family. The institution of marriage would be undercut if individuals, although
capable of providing for their spouses, were allowed to keep them in financial need. Cf. Grey,
Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS. 83, 83-90 (1980) (arguing
that the Court's decisions involving a constitutional right of privacy were concerned not ,vith
an individual's right to use contraceptives or procure an abortion, but rather were, "like the
general run of the Court's decisions in this area, dedicated to the cause of social stability through
the reinforcement of traditional institutions").
For other important objectives underlying the Court's decisions, see, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (prevention of illegitimate pregnancies); Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76 (1979) (providing benefits to children deprived of basic sustenance because of a parent's
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first step of the middle-tier analysis.

B.

Substantial Relation to the Objective

The second step of the middle-tier test requires that the primary/secondary modification be substantially related to achieving the objective
of protecting needy spouses. The modification fails to meet this part
of the test in three ways. First, even under the lax rational basis test,
the modification is not sufficiently inclusive to meet the constitutional
mandate of fairly benefiting and burdening all persons similarly situated.
Second, even if the modification did meet the requirements of the rational basis test, it would nonetheless fail the stricter fit requirements
of the substantial relation test. 47 Finally, even assuming it could meet
these stricter fit requirements, it still could not be justified given that
there is a gender-neutral rule available that would be equally effective
in achieving the objective.
1. Underinclusion - classification fails to achieve objective- Leading
commentators have suggested that, to meet the reasonable relation requirement of the rational basis test, a classification must include "all
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law. " 48 Insofar as the purpose of the rule holding husbands primarily
liable is to help needy spouses, it is evident that the classification is
"underinclusive" because it fails to include needy husbands. 49
unemployment); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) {compensation for past economic
discrimination against females); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) {protection of public health
and safety); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) {providing children deprived of one
parent the opportunity for the personal attention of the other parent); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975) {fair and equitable advancement programs in the armed forces).
47. Because the equal protection clause does not require that all persons be treated alike,
but only that similarly situated persons be treated alike, see Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147
(1940), gender classifications have been upheld where it was shown that the classification "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances," Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) {plurality opinion). Thus, for example, the Court
has upheld gender classifications designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against
women since men and women are not similarly situated with respect to this discrimination. See,
e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) {per curiam); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The Court has refused, however, to uphold
classifications not grounded in any dissimilarity but rather based on "archaic and overbroad
generalizations" that assume a wife's dependency on her husband and therefore do not reflect
contemporary society. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). This refusal is based
on the Court's heightened concern that gender-based classifications be closely related to their
objective.
48. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 31 CwF. L. REv. 341,346 (1949).
49. The classification is also "overinclusive" because it benefits some non-needy wives.
Although commentators have suggested that "overinclusiveness" is a greater evil than
"underinclusiveness," see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1086-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at
351, the Supreme Court has held that "overinclusiveness" does not render a classification un-
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Although ''underinclusiveness'' is said to be prima facie evidence that
the classification is not reasonable, 50 the Court occasionally has upheld
such classifications. 51 The Court's rationale in these instances is generally
that practical considerations prevent requiring legislatures to attack all
aspects of a problem at once. 52 For example, if a problem is too large
to be remedied all at once, the legislature may be allowed discretion
to choose which aspects of the problem are most serious. 53 Such is
not the case with helping needy spouses, however. The only practical
consideration involved in holding husbands primarily liable is the administrative convenience of assuming wives are dependent rather than
requiring a determination in each case as to which, if either, spouse
is actually dependent. The Court, however, has held that the administrative inconvenience of having to hold hearings is not sufficient
justification to support a gender-based classification. 54 Consequently,
the Court is unlikely to uphold any classification that fails to include
needy husbands.
2. Statistics insufficient to justify gender as proxy- Even assuming
that the primary/secondary modification is sufficiently inclusive to
satisfy the rational basis test, it nonetheless fails to meet the stricter
fit requirements used in evaluating gender-based classifications. Under
the middle-tier test, where gender is used as a proxy for some other
basis of classification, it must accurately reflect this other basis. 55 The
reason is clear: use of gender as an inaccurate proxy unfairly stereotyp~
all females with a characteristic regardless of how many actually possess
constitutional, see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Therefore, the benefit afforded some
non-needy wives is irrelevant for equal protection purposes.
50. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at 348; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 519 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Such underinclusiveness manifests 'a prima
facie violation of the equal protection requirement of reasonable classification' •..• ") (quoting
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48).
51. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (sellers of ready-to-wear
glasses need not be subjected to regulations imposed on opticians); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (vehicles advertising products of the vehicle's owner
may be exempted from regulation forbidding use of advertising vehicles on city streets); Semler
v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (regulations forbidding dentists
to advertise need not extend to other classes of professionals).
52. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,495 (1974) (" '[T]he Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all."') (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970));
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935); L. TRmE, supra note 5, § 16-4, at 997; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at 348-49; Equal Protection, supra note 49, at 1084-85.
53. See L. TRmE, supra note 5, § 16-4, at 997; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at 349;
Equal Protection, supra note 49, at 1084-85.
54. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688- 89 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971) ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause . . . .").
55. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
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it. 56 Thus, by using gender as a proxy for need, the primary/secondary modification labels all wives as "dependent," and thereby unconstitutionally demeans the efforts of those wives who do work. 57
In addition, this process of stigmatization often has the negative effect of perpetuating traditional stereotypic views of women. 58 By assuming wives are dependent and treating them as dependent, a classifica-tion reinforces the view that females need special protection. Moreover,
using classifications designed to give this protection makes it difficult
for women to break out of their stereotypic roles. 59 Protective classifications have the effect of denying females the opportunity to become
fully responsible persons, 60 and reaffirm the commonly held belief
that they need special protection. The entire process becomes a vicious
circle working to insure that women never attain truly equal status. 61
These potentially adverse effects must be minimized by requiring that
gender be used as a proxy only where it accurately reflects the underlying classification. In the case of the primary/secondary modification,
however, statistics do not show a close enough correlation between
gender and dependence to justify the use of a gender classification.
56. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("statutory
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of
females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individuals members").
57. The Court has repeatedly held that gender-based classifications may not operate to denigrate
the female wage earner. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 148 (1980);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
58. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, l02 S. Ct. 3331, 3333 (1982) (policy of excluding males from nursing program "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as
an exclusively woman's job"); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) ("Legislative classifications
which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection."); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975) (To argue that female children do not need child support
as Jong as male children because they do not go to school as long "is to be self-serving: if the
female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school
as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing
society has long imposed."). See generally L. TRmE, supra note 5, § 16-25; Harzenski & Weckesser,
The Case for Strictly Scrutinizing Gender-Based Separate But Equal Classification Schemes,
52 TEMP. L.Q. 439, 472-78 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 49, 100-03
(1975).
59. See Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 58, at 469-71.
60. Id. at 469.
61. Cf. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 55 (1977):
The law ... has long been one of the chief instruments for assuring the dependency
of women. • . . If a woman is, for some legal purposes, a thing, if the law treats her
in some contexts as incapable of behaving as an adult, if the law reminds her at every
turn that she is a dependent - then is it any wonder that she internalizes the stigma
of inferiority and assumes herself to be less than fully human? . . . A woman who
has been brought to think that she is incapable of filling a particular soda! role is
incapable.
_(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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Although, on the average, women tend to earn less than men, 62 it does
not necessarily follow that the wife is always, or even usually, dependent on her husband and thus needy. On the contrary, recent statistics
indicate that in fifty-two percent of all married-couple families, both
the husband and wife work. 63 Consequently, in fifty-two percent of
all families, the wife is at most only partially dependent upon her husband. Moreover, in almost three and one-half percent of married-couple
families, the wife is the only wage earner. 64 Although this seems to
be a small percentage, it means that potentially 1,707,000 husbands
are totally dependent upon their wives. 65
Based on these statistics, it appears that using gender as a proxy
for need may be accurate only slightly more than forty-four percent
of the time. In the other fifty-six percent of cases, however, where
the wife is at least a joint wage earner and in some cases the sole wage
earner, she is being unfairly branded with the label ''dependent,•• complete with its stereotypic and degrading effects. 66 Given these effects
in such a potentially large percentage of cases, gender is hardly a sufficiently accurate proxy for need to meet the substantial relation
requirement.
3. A vai/ability of a gender-neutral alternative- Even assuming that
gender is an accurate proxy for need and that holding husbands primarily
liable does achieve the desired result, the classification still cannot be
upheld. Where a gender-neutral rule is available that would achieve
the desired objective, a gender-based rule cannot be employed. 67
62. See
REv., Jan.
63. See
64. See

Rytina, Occupational segregation and earnings differences by sex, MoNnn.Y LAB.
1981, at 49, 49 & n.l.
supra note 13.
supra note 16.
65. Id. Some account must be taken here of those husbands who do not work but who are
independently wealthy and thus not dependent on their working wives. Account must also be
taken of working husbands who may be partially dependent.
66. This is not to say that wives who are, in fact, dependent should feel any degradation
because of their status. The degradation occurs when those wives who are not dependent are
labeled dependent, thus insinuating that the work they do is insignificant.
67. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 283 (1979). This rule was apparently contradicted in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 473 (1981), where a plurality stated that it is not necessary to prefer a gender-neutral
rule if a non-neutral rule - drawn within constitutional limits - is available. Obviously, the
plurality in Michael M. did not feel that the existence of a gender-neutral rule is relevant in
determining whether a classification is sufficiently precise to be constitutional. This contradicts
the majority decisions of O" and Wengler.
To reach the conclusion that a gender-neutral rule need not be preferred, the plurality relied
on a footnote in the majority opinion of Kahn v. Shevin. This footnote states that it is insufficient to argue that the "[l)egislature could have drafted the statute differently, so that its purpose
would have been accomplished more precisely. . . . [T]he issue . . . is not whether the statute
could have been drafted more wisely, but whether the lines chosen ... are within constitutional
limitations." 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974). It is apparent that this footnote was improperly
relied upon because it was not meant to apply to the question of preferring a gender-neutral
rule over a gender-based one. Rather, the footnote in Kahn was in response to the argument .
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At least three gender-neutral alternatives are available that would
achieve the objective of helping needy spouses. 68 First, the husband
and wife could be held jointly and severally liable. Second, courts might
hold the spouse who incurred the debt primarily liable and the other
spouse secondarily liable. 69 Finally, liability could be imposed on
whichever spouse was better able to handle the financial burden. 10 Which
of these alternatives is preferable is irrelevant to the question of the
constitutionality of the gender-based classification. The mere existence
of a viable gender-neutral rule indicates that the gender-based rule of
holding husbands primarily liable cannot be substantially related to
the objective of helping needy spouses.
CONCLUSION

The common law doctrine of necessaries undoubtedly had a legitimate
basis at one time. No longer, however, can the assumption of a wife's
dependency constitutionally sustain a gender-based classification such
as the primary/secondary modification. Not only does this modification ignore dependent husbands, it also demeans the efforts of working wives by perpetuating the stereotypic view that the wife is the dependent spouse. In addition, there are several gender-neutral alternatives
available that would achieve the desired objective of assisting needy
spouses. These considerations indicate that the primary/secondary
modification unconstitutionally denies the equal protection rights of
men and women. Insofar as the modification is unconstitutional, it
is not a legitimate means of reforming the common law doctrine of
necessaries. Any such reformation must be gender neutral to be
constitutional.

-Debra S. Betteridge
that the statute was not substantially related to the achievement of the state's objective because
it was overinclusive - it benefited some who did not need the benefit and it could have been
drawn to exclude these people. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, the footnote should
not be read as saying that it is not necessary to use a gender-neutral rule if one is available.
68. A fourth alternative, that of holding neither spouse liable for necessary debts incurred
by the other, while gender neutral, would not advance the objective of helping needy spouses
obtain what they need because there would be no one to hold liable if they were unable to pay.
69. For those states that apply these two alternatives, see supra notes 19 & 21 and accompanying text.
70. At the present time, no state has adopted this alternative. Use of this alternative would
require a case-by-case determination of which spouse could better afford the cost. Because of
its administrative inconvenience, this rule has been rejected in favor of the gender-based rule
requiring no such determination. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 525, 314
N. W .2d 326, 335-36 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Yet because
the Court has held that administrative inconvenience is not a sufficient reason to prefer one
gender over another, see supra note 54 and accompanying text, the rule remains a viable alternative available for use in achieving the state's objective of helping needy spouses.

